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Reparations for Victims at the International Criminal Court: A New Way 
Forward? 
Introduction 
Most articles on reparations and other victim provisions at the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) often open with how ‘innovative’ these provisions are for a criminal 
court. However nearly twenty years on from the agreement on the Rome Statute in 
1998, there has yet to a shared understanding on how reparations should look like at 
the ICC. Despite three convictions and one guilty plea at the Court there has only 
been one reparations decision in the Lubanga case in 2012, and it still has not made it 
out of the courtroom to the victims. The novelty of reparations has faded as the hard 
reality of translating meaningful redress for thousands of victims into practice 
becomes apparent. These challenges stem from loading reparations for numerous 
victims on the back of the conviction of a single person. The ICC remains a criminal 
court with reparations copy-and-pasted at the end, leaving it dependent on which 
perpetrators and charges are convicted.1 
Although there are reasonable expectations that the ICC would deliver justice 
to victims, the failure to dispense timely and appropriate reparations continues to 
undermine the legitimacy of the Court. More worryingly, there has been limited 
recognition of certain types of victimisation and access to the court, in particular 
sexual and gender-based violence. Despite the factual occurrence of sexual violence 
in the first four completed cases before the Court, only in the Bemba case saw the first 
conviction for rape at the ICC. The lack of convictions for sexual violence has not 
been due to lack of participation from victims, but rather insufficient evidence or 
narrow selection of charges.2  
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This article explores the continuing wrangles over reparations at the ICC. It 
begins by outlining the reparation regime at the Court, including a discussion on the 
drafters’ intention in including such measures, before moving onto examine three 
continuing quandaries of reparations at the ICC: the relationship between the charged 
convicted and victim eligibility; the role of the Trust Fund for Victims and its 
assistance mandate; and instances of acquittals and the role of the state. These 
predicaments reflect the continuing disputed role of reparations at the Court amongst 
judges, victims and other organs of the Court. In particular this article analyses 
reparations for sexual violence, which has been prevalent in the first few cases before 
the ICC and calls for reparations, yet remains limited to assistance programmes by the 
Trust Fund. In light of the contested space of reparations at the ICC this article 
explores three possible options in finding a more settled approached to delivering 
justice to victims through such measures through: transformative reparations; 
reparative complementarity; and a reparations chamber. 
 
Justifying Reparations at the International Criminal Court 
Reparations in the Rome Statute were one of the cornerstones of a more victim-
centred approach of the ICC, distinguishing it from previous international criminal 
tribunals. In the early drafts of the Rome Statute before the International Law 
Commission some delegates felt that reparations would be inappropriate for a 
criminal court, owing to their complexity and the large numbers of victims affected 
by international crimes.3 In order to overcome this a trust fund was include for the 
‘benefit of victims of crime’ collected from fines or confiscated property. 4 
Subsequently the Preparatory Commission deemed it was more feasible to make the 
state responsible for reparations if an individual convicted person acting in an official 
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capacity was indigent, or in the case of non-state actors to allow the Court to 
recommend reparations to the affected state.5  
At the Rome Conference there was a general consensus amongst states to 
prevent the ICC having the authority to order reparations against a state as a deal-
breaker, as it would detract from punishing individual perpetrators. 6  As a result 
Article 75 in the Rome Statute is explicitly limited to individuals, with the Trust Fund 
for Victims (TFV) in Article 79 included to act as a stopgap for funding if the 
convicted person has no assets. However, Article 79 also provides that it will be for 
the ‘benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’, which has been 
interpreted by the Assembly of State Parties as creating an assistance mandate beyond 
just facilitating reparations.7 
In comparison to other international reparation bodies, such as the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights or the UN Claims Commission, the ICC represents 
a unique reparations system. It is not based on state responsibility, and it does not 
follow more tort or delicts requirements of private law. Instead the ICC system 
represents something closer to the partie civil procedure common in civil law 
countries, where victims join the criminal case to seek compensation.8 Although the 
partie civil analogy may make sense for a criminal court, it is grossly inadequate 
when addressing international crimes and reparations, where the issue of numerous 
victims is also compounded by the complexity of the trial, the political nature of 
violence and the larger commission of violence by numerous actors and other crimes 
that are not captured in the trial of one or a few individuals.  
Other international criminal tribunals have highlighted the constraints of 
containing reparations within a criminal process. Not long after the agreement of the 
Rome Statute, the judges at both the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
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Rwanda wrote letters to the UN Security Council supporting victims claims for 
compensation, but finding that reparation proceedings would be time consuming, 
likely to increase the workload of the Tribunals, and contrary to the defendant’s right 
to an expeditious trial. 9  Instead, the judges suggested that a separate claims 
commission established by the UN Security Council would be better placed to realise 
victims’ rights to reparation. Effectively the drafters’ intention of the Rome Statute 
was to give effect to notions of ‘justice for victims’ by allowing them to claim 
reparations against individual convicted persons, but not to encroach upon state 
responsibility. As the ICC started to complete its first few cases from 2012 onwards, 
the implementation of this framework ring-fencing responsibility around only 
convicted individuals has started to strain the feasibility of reparations at the Court. 
The current quandary: Between law and expectations 
Despite the overarching goal of doing justice for victims through reparations, there 
remain two major fault lines that continue to cause debate amongst ICC judges: the 
relationship between the charges of which the perpetrator is convicted and eligibility 
for victims; and the role of the Trust Fund for Victims and its assistance mandate. A 
third emerging issue has caused more confusion in the recent Ruto and Sang case with 
regards to situations where there is insufficient evidence or a defendant is acquitted 
leaving it up in the air what role or responsibility the ICC and the state have in 
ensuring ‘justice for victims’ with reparations. 
 
Relationship between convicted charges and victim eligibility for reparations 
Article 75(2) clearly states that the ‘Court may make an order directly against a 
convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims’. 
However, it does not stipulate whether such reparations should be based on the 
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charges of which the perpetrator is convicted or a broader examination of his/her 
responsibility at a lower evidential standard for reparations. In the Lubanga case aside 
from the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber disagreeing over whether or not 
Thomas Lubanga was responsible for reparations, with the latter finding he was, they 
also fundamentally disagreed on which victims were eligible for reparations.10 This 
stems from the narrow charges brought by the Prosecutor against Lubanga for only 
using child soldiers, despite the numerous other alleged crimes he was responsible for 
and the challenges victims made to the Court to broaden them to include sexual 
violence.11 Although the Prosecution called for sexual violence to be included in the 
sentencing and reparations decisions, they presented no further evidence than that 
which was incidentally raised through witness testimony or questions by the victims’ 
legal representatives. 12 As a result, reparations in the first case of Lubanga were 
limited to those who were child soldiers in his militia. Accordingly, victims’ 
eligibility for reparations at the ICC is dependent on the Prosecutor’s selection of 
charges and perpetrators, effectively a prioritisation of suffering based on evidence 
and expeditiousness that creates a stark hierarchy of victimhood in reparation 
proceedings. 
It make legal sense that a person should only be held to account for the crimes 
of which they are found guilty and the added expressive dimensions for victims in 
acknowledging the convicted person’s responsibility for their suffering,13 However, it 
very much reflects that reparations are an ‘add-on’ to the criminal trial. This is 
contrary to the nature of reparations, which are intended to be victim-centred in 
responding to their harm, rather than being dependent on the identification, 
prosecution or conviction of an accused.14 As Stahn asserts the Appeals Chamber 
stipulates a more ‘perpetrator-centred’ vision of reparations at the ICC.15 This has 
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implications on the burden of proof, proportionality of reparations of which the 
perpetrator is found liable and the role victims in the trial proceedings.16 As Williams 
and Palmer note similar limitations with the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, prosecutors can be cautious in how they approach or neglect certain 
crimes, closing or limiting avenues for victims to obtain redress before international 
courts. 17 The convoluted nature of reparations at the ICC and the narrow victim 
eligibility for such measures is further obscured by the role of the Trust Fund and its 
assistance programmes. 
 
Role of the Trust Fund for Victims and its assistance mandate 
Despite an Appeals Chamber decision and order on reparations, the role of the TFV 
and its mandate for reparations and assistance still remain contested. In the Lubanga 
case the TFV, which has been funding a number of assistance programmes in the 
DRC, was held by the Trial Chamber as being ‘well placed’ to ‘determine appropriate 
forms of reparations and to implement them’.18 The Appeals Chamber modified the 
Trial Chamber’s approach, which made victim participation dependent on whether the 
TFV ‘considers it appropriate’. 19  Moreover, the Appeals Chamber stipulated that 
victims would be consulted on collective reparations before the TFV implements 
them, clawing back some of victims’ agency in the reparation process.20 However, the 
Appeals Chamber rejected the Trial Chamber’s endorsement of the TFV’s suggestion 
of community-based reparations.21 As a result, the Appeals Chamber clarified the line 
between reparations and assistance, with the former being responsive to victims’ 
rights and the latter benefitting affected communities, as well as vindicating victims’ 
agency before the ICC in reparation proceedings. The Appeals Chamber’s approach 
represents a shift from the Trial Chamber’s decision in Lubanga that rubber-stamped 
 7 
the TFV’s five point plan for reparations, which effectively gave them decision 
making powers over it, to the Appeals Chamber’s more closer supervision of each 
stage of the TFV implementation of reparations by a new constituted Trial Chamber 
II. 
Since the Appeals Chambers judgment in 2015 contest has continued with the 
TFV arguing that community based reparations are the only way for reparations to 
become ‘meaningful for cases of mass atrocities which fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Court.’ 22 Furthermore, the Trust Fund asserted that the definition of a victim 
under Rule 85 of Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence was too narrow, and 
beneficiaries of reparations do not need to meet such a standard. 23  The Appeals 
Chamber noted that while victims of sexual violence would be ineligible for 
reparations in the Lubanga case, it is appropriate for the Board of Directors of the 
TFV to consider at its discretion of including such victims within its assistance 
mandate.24 This exhibits the distinction between the limits of the reparations regime 
imagined by the drafters of the Rome Statute and the rhetoric and want of ICC actors 
to expand the benefits of reparations as assistance to the largest possible group of 
victims.  
The continuing wrangling over reparations between the judges and TFV 
suggests that the Trust Fund is struggling to fit its mostly assistance approach into a 
juridical one, where it is used to more discretion in distributing funds based on needs 
rather than responding to victims’ rights.25 This reflects a critical juncture between 
reparations as a right to be claimed by victims with legal standing against a 
discretionary needs-based approach. The TFV’s role in reparations risks diluting 
victims’ ‘right’ to reparation by merging it with assistance. The Appeals Chamber 
only recognised that assistance and reparations may become blurred where it risks 
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prejudicing the rights of the convicted person, rather than as a concern for ensuring 
victims’ right to reparation.26  
It is likely that the vast majority of cases before the ICC that result in 
reparations will always be dependent on the TFV for financial support and reparations 
delivery. In cases where perpetrators have substantial financial assets these are likely 
to be depleted through funding their defence counsel, such as the in Bemba case 
where the defendant had over €5 million in assets seized, but over €2.79 million had 
been spent by December 2014 and he is now a defendant in a witnessing tampering 
trial.27 
As Dixon refers to this as the ‘Swiss cheese model’ whereby the TFV 
assistance mandate is used to ‘fill in the gaps of reparations regimes where they are 
restricted by legal definitions of victims and victimization’.28 However the difficulty 
with reparations at the ICC is that these gaps remain quite wide that even assistance if 
well coordinated is unlikely to sufficiently provide any meaningful redress to victims. 
In all the emerging ICC reparations regime is overly elaborate and a headache even 
for lawyers. This complex system is likely to change with the second case of Katanga 
where most victims are looking for individual compensation, rather than more 
collective awards made in the Lubanga case. 
 
Acquittals and the responsibility of the state 
The final contested area of reparations at the ICC involves situations where a 
defendant is not found responsible for a crime, such as there being insufficient 
evidence against them, the defendant dies during the trial, declared unfit or is 
acquitted, preventing any reparation proceedings. This is the situation that judges 
faced in the collapse of the Ruto and Sang case due to insufficient evidence against 
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the accused. The judges were divided on whether or not reparations could be ordered 
despite no one being convicted. As Judge Fremr bluntly stated  
As a result of the case ending without a conviction, no reparations order can 
be made by this Court pursuant to Article 75 for the benefit of victims of the 
post-election violence. While I recognise that this must be dissatisfactory to 
the victims, a criminal court can only address compensation for harm suffered 
as a result of crimes if such crimes have been found to have taken place and 
the person standing trial for his or her participation in those crimes is found 
guilty.29 
Judge Fremr acknowledged that the Post-Election Violence (PEV) and victims’ 
suffering was never contested.30 Yet this position reflects the fatal flaw of reparations 
at the ICC that after years of waiting for justice and dependent on the Court being the 
last resort for redress, it ultimately dependent on which individuals and charges are 
convicted. 
It comes at no surprise that one of the other judges was compelled to bridge 
the gap between victims’ expectations and the mandate of the ICC under the more 
general rubric and marketing of the Court of ‘doing justice for victims’. Judge Eboe-
Osuji distinguished the collapse of the Ruto and Sang case from the Appeals Chamber 
reparations decision in the Lubanga case. 31  Although he recognised the value in 
placing the responsibility of making reparations at the foot of those who cause such 
harm to victims, despite their indigence, he suggest that it was not the only basis for 
reparations at the ICC.  
Judge Eboe-Osuji broke away from the Lubanga case reasoning by stating that 
based on other sources of international law ‘there is no general principle of law that 
requires conviction as a prerequisite to reparation.’32 He argued that a conviction is an 
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undesirable prerequisite for reparations, given that victims suffer harm regardless of 
the individual responsibility of perpetrators and individual litigation is inefficient, 
which has often seen states create no-fault criminal compensation schemes. As such, 
Judge Eboe-Osuji asserted that the ICC process establishes victims’ victimhood status 
and reparations should follow from it, rather the finding of guilt of the accused, which 
are ‘beyond the control of the victims’.33 That all said his finding of the Ruto and 
Sang case being frustrated by a campaign of the Kenyan government and its failure to 
provide reparations or effectively investigate the PEV, could give rise to an obligation 
to make reparations at the international level. Accordingly while courting the 
boundaries of explicitly limiting of reparations to convicted person, and the drafters’ 
intent to avoid state responsibility, Judge Eboe-Osuji suggested the reparations be 
based on the Kenyan government’s lack of cooperation and called upon victims to 
submit their views and concerns.34  
In response the common victims legal representative (CVLR) Wilfred Nderitu 
argued that the Kenyan state has a ‘reversionary obligation’ to make reparations to 
victims by ceding to international treaties and the Rome Statute as it is ceding 
national jurisdiction. He also suggested that the ratifying Kenyan act of the Rome 
Statute makes provision for ‘any assistance’, which could be interpreted as including 
the Court making a request of the Kenyan government to ensure victims receive 
reparations.35 Agreeing with Judge Eboe-Osuji the CVLR is able to look past the 
language of Article 75(2) in requiring a conviction as the sole basis of reparations. 
Instead given the failure of the Kenyan government to investigating and remedy the 
Post-Election Violence, it incurs state responsibility. Moreover the CVLR argues that 
despite his own mandate to represent victims in the case, all victims in the Kenyan 
situation should be eligible for reparations. 36  Accordingly given the Kenyan 
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government’s lack of cooperation with the ICC and its failure to fulfil its obligations 
under the Rome Statute, the Court should make an order against it or at least refer it to 
the Assembly of State Parties for non-compliance.37 Ultimately the majority of judges 
in Trial Chamber V(A) rejected the standing of the CVLR and Trust Fund to make 
submissions on reparations as case against the Ruto and Sang was terminated, ending 
the jurisdiction of the Court.38 Perhaps the International Court of Justice is a more 
appropriate forum for such treaty breaches. 
Together this evolving position in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ruto and 
Sang case represents the ambiguous legal boundaries the judges are working within 
while trying to attain some form of meaningful justice for victims. The language of 
Article 75(2) states that the ‘Court may make an order directly against a convicted 
person’. There is no explicit limit on reparations being connected to the convicted 
person, but in practice after years of trial proceedings all the evidence will point to the 
accused, it is a different proceeding to examine the responsibility for other actors for 
reparations. That said during Lubanga’s trial Uganda and Rwanda were implicated in 
training and supporting him, implying their responsibility in his crimes. Judge Eboe-
Osuji postulates the responsibility of states in reparations before the ICC, but does not 
go far to promise or rule on it. There are political and financial consequences as the 
Assembly of State Parties could exert pressure on the Court by withholding funds or 
failing to cooperate with the ICC. 
 
Overcoming these challenges 
Given these limitations and the continued debate over the purpose and legal basis of 
reparations at the ICC, where can the Court go from here? There are three possible 
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solutions: transformative reparations; reparative complementarity; and a reparations 
chamber. 
 
The promise of transformative reparations at the ICC 
Transformative reparations have been increasingly advocated in the aftermath of 
widespread or systematic sexual violence, where the occurrence of the crime reflects 
more ingrained structural discrimination and marginalisation of certain groups that 
precipitates such violence. More broadly transformative reparations have been shifted 
the gaze on the nature of reparations to examine the gendered impact of conflict on 
women as well as on social and economic rights. 39  According to Rubin-Marín, 
reparations can also have a transformational potential ‘to subvert, instead of reinforce, 
pre-existing structural … inequalities and thereby to contribute, however minimally, 
to the consolidation of more inclusive democratic regimes’. 40  Yet, ruptures in 
governance and the law may not offer opportune moments to reform social and 
cultural perceptions and practices when more pressing needs of security, peace and 
redress need to be tackled. 
 There has been increasing attention to tackle sexual violence in terms of 
transformative reparations to better address the causes and cultures that precipitate 
such violence.41 The Nairobi Declaration 2007 states that reparations 
‘must drive post-conflict transformation of socio-cultural injustices, and 
political and structural inequalities that shape the lives of women and girls; 
that reintegration and restitution by themselves are not sufficient goals of 
reparation, since the origins of violations of women’s and girls’ human rights 
predate the conflict situation.’42 
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It is within this theoretical space that reparations in the Lubanga case were 
constructed in collective terms to victims as transformative reparations, no matter 
how limited, could contribute to preventing future violence.43 The TFV drawing from 
academic research and the Nairobi Declaration recognised the limits of restitutio in 
integrum and advocated for transformative reparations that would eliminate ‘the pre-
existing structural inequalities that have led to or encouraged the violence.’ 44 
Adopting this approach, the Trial Chamber stated  
Reparations may include measures to address the shame felt by some former 
child soldiers, and to prevent any future victimisation, particularly when they 
endured sexual violence, torture and inhumane and degrading treatment 
following their recruitment. … the Court's reparations strategy should, in part, 
be directed at preventing future conflicts and raising awareness that the 
effective reintegration of the children requires eradicating the victimisation, 
discrimination and stigmatisation of young people in these circumstances.45 
The Appeals Chamber agreed with such an approach, given that it is up for the TFV 
to deliver reparations.46 
It may just all be hopefully thinking and rhetoric that one reparation award by 
the ICC can transform a society and prevent future conflict. Durbach and Chappell 
note that the transformational reparations proposed by the TFV and Chamber suggest 
an ‘aspirational’ goal, but was not challenged by other parties before the Court.47 
Ullrich in her research of Court judges and staff suggest that transformative 
reparations is superficial and even neo-colonial. 48  The ICC does not have a 
democratic mandate to reform State Parties’ societies through reparations. 
Transformative reparations need to be placed within their political, economic, social 
and cultural context.49 Moreover, using victims’ claims for reparations as a means of 
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social engineering risks exploiting their suffering to improve the legitimacy of the 
Court and the State. As Walker suggests beyond the challenges of practical realism 
and political feasibility, transformative reparations endanger displacing victim-
centred nature of reparations in remedying their harm to instrumentalising them for 
social justice.50 As such, transformative reparations can undermine the importance of 
the remedial and individual acknowledgement of victims’ suffering, by placing it 
secondary improving a society and preventing future victimisation. This tension 
between remedial and transformative reparations was noted by the Peruvian 
Comprehensive Reparations (PIR) that in developing a reparations programme, 
...the PIR cannot and should not be considered as one more instrument of 
social policy. The PIR does not seek to resolve problems of poverty, exclusion 
and inequality, which are structural in nature and respond to the overall 
operation of the political and economic system. While some of its programs 
can and should contribute to improving the quality of life of victims and their 
family members, its central objective is the repair and recognition of victims 
as human beings, whose fundamental rights have been violated. This does not 
mean that the State should not also undertake a policy of social development 
aimed at attacking poverty and inequality at the root … but the PIR responds 
to other goals.51 
As such, the transformative potential of reparations rests in their ability to prioritise 
and publicise victimisation and underlying structural inequalities that precipitated or 
compounded violence. Where reparations are used solely to prevent future 
victimisation, such as community education or human rights training for the armed 
forces, and not redressing the individual harm. This risks overburdening the 
expectations of reparations in affected communities and forces those victimised to 
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forego their remedy in the wide hope of reconciliation and peace. In such 
circumstances victims of past violence are silenced or neglected to extend the gaze of 
the transition to future peace and reconciliation. This is a result of judicially based 
reparations being delivered through an assistance mandated Trust Fund, which 
fundamentally changes the nature and benefit of such reparations to victims. 
Reparations as a vehicle of remedy are victim-centred measures of redress to 
vindicate victims’ rights. As such victims are in the front passenger giving directions 
on what reparations are appropriate in redressing their harm with judges steering the 
process. The current Lubanga reparations scheme places the TFV in the driving seat 
with the judges as passengers watching the Trust Fund’s advance of its peacebuilding 
and assistance mandate, and victims left behind on the side of the road, no better off. 
In looking forward to preventing future violence, victims become increasingly distant, 
shrinking objects in the rear view mirror as we move closer to tackling wider causes 
of violence, maximising welfare or community benefits. Ultimately the greater the 
focus on transformative reparations at the ICC the further we lose sight of redressing 
the harm of those who suffered the most. While in the Lubanga case transformative 
reparations may benefit female child soldiers who suffered sexual violence, by 
including them in rehabilitation or community awareness schemes, it negates the 
acknowledgement and more direct remedy of their individual harm. 
Usually there is a not a clear demarcation between transformative and more 
corrective or restorative reparations, this academic debate may be moot in practice. 
The Trial and Appeals Chambers in the Lubanga case both abdicated their oversight 
of what reparations should substantively involve by allowing the TFV to shape it, 
rather than taking into account what was appropriate for the victims. In the Katanga 
case the victims are more at odds with this approach, with the majority demanding 
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individual compensation and finding collective and transformative measures as 
ineffective as non-victimised members of the community were able to benefit.52 The 
quandary of reparations at the ICC reflects an existential crisis for the Court, which 
tasked with investigating, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators is then left at the 
end of the process with trying to address the rights of victims. The Court itself does 
not have a coherent approach in what reparations should look like, instead the TFV is 
able to portray its assistance mandate as reparations, which from the Katanga case is 
not what victims want. Framing reparations at the ICC as transformative and through 
the TFV as repackaged assistance is likely to cause victims to disengage with the 
Court, as their role is reduced to policy legitimisation and facilitation for others rather 
than their individual redress. This is already occurred with 47 victims pulling out of 
participating in the Ruto and Sang case before it collapsed on the grounds of 
collective reparations would benefit the communities that contributed to their 
victimisation.53 
Ultimately the TFV reparations construction in the Lubanga case is effectively 
trying to deliver guarantees of non-repetition, which are really the responsibility of 
states. The TFV is unlikely to have the capacity to deliver to deliver such measures on 
a large scale, long term and meaningful way. Instead what is needed is state 
cooperation and a rethinking of the obligations on state parties and the notion of 
complementarity. 
 
Revisiting reparative complementarity 
If the ICC is an ineffectual or inappropriate locus in delivering transformative 
reparations, then the State in which the crime occurs is the necessary actor to ensure 
the rights of victims.54 In the Lubanga case the judges missed an opportunity to call 
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upon the Congolese government to establish a national reparations mechanism, 
instead it suggested that the State could cooperate through educational or outreach 
activities to acknowledge victims’ harm and to increase society’s awareness of the 
crimes committed by Mr Lubanga.55  
The relationship between the Court and State Parties is guided by the principle of 
complementarity, in that states have the primary obligation to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes with the ICC only intervening as a last resort where the 
state is unable or unwilling to meet its obligations, so-called ‘negative 
complementarity’.56 Positive complementarity is in narrow terms how States can be 
encouraged to investigate and prosecute international crimes, in broader terms how 
the ICC can catalyse wider transitional justice processes in a country guided by fair 
trial practices and human rights. In terms of reparations, complementarity could begin 
to fill the gap between the limited scope of victims who will be eligible for redress at 
the ICC and the larger population of individuals and groups who have suffered from 
international crimes in a situation. This has been termed ‘reparative complementarity’ 
in that to effectively provide reparations in a situation such as the DRC, the State 
Party needs to create a domestic reparations programme to complement any 
reparation awards by the Court.57 Otherwise reparations at the ICC only benefit a few 
victims in a situation, which could cause tensions within communities or secondary 
victimisation to those victims excluded from the Court’s awards. Reparative 
complementarity does not go as far as a ‘reversionary obligation’ suggested by the 
CVLR in the Ruto and Sang case, but recognises the role States should actively play 
in developing domestic reparation programmes giving their existing human rights 
obligations to remedy for such violations whether committed by state or non-state 
actors.58 
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What should reparative complementarity look like? In terms of sexual violence, 
Durbach and Chappell asserts that to achieve gender justice for sexual violence it 
‘requires extensive state-sponsored, collective measures to bring about equal gender 
representation in decision making, a significant redistribution of economic resources 
and the removal of socially and culturally embedded gender-biased practices.’ 59 
Transformative reparations could achieve some of these goals, but even reparations 
have their limits. It would require substantial engagement of a multitude of state and 
non-state actors to tackle the causes and consequences of violence that its simply 
formulation has plagued the transitional justice field for decades.  
To transform the legal regime for sexual violence, laws on rape, domestic 
violence, procedural and evidential rules on vulnerable witnesses and victims would 
need to be reformed. This may be too interventionist for the ICC, which was 
established to investigate and prosecute international crimes, rather than catalyst 
diverse national legal systems into uniform ones beyond international criminal law. 
Moreover, the need for changes in terms of gender representation and economic 
redistribution require a substantial rethinking of the constitutional, social and cultural 
practices of a country. In addition, gender equality and the impact of crimes of 
women would need to be substantively addressed, but so do the structural harm 
suffered by other victims. There is a danger of creating a hierarchy of victimhood by 
only prioritising gender in reparation debates, while vital, there are other marginalised 
victims such as children, those left disabled or seriously injured, indigenous or ethnic 
minorities, or families of those disappeared who also acutely require reparations to 
alleviate their continuing suffering and to prevent the repetition of such crimes. There 
has been little engagement on reparations by situations complementing the work of 
the ICC. This could be due to the controversial and costly nature of reparations, which 
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go to heart of debates on who is responsible for the violence and who deserves to be 
acknowledged as a victims and their harm remedied. 
In narrow terms reparative complementarity can ensure that State Parties fulfil 
their obligations to cooperate with the ICC in terms of identification, tracing and 
freezing of assets, or the exhumation of grave sites in returning bodies of those 
disappeared to families. 60  A more expansive approach to complementarity as a 
transitional justice driver in a country risks overburdening the ICC with a 
superjudicial function that its jurisprudence has political weight that can override 
domestic democratic processes. With the collapse of the Kenyan cases at the ICC, 
there is a strong impetus to think about what the cooperation obligations are on states 
and how best the ICC and the Assembly of State Parties can enforce such duties.  
 
A Reparations Chamber 
Given the length of trials, the requirements of victims’ eligibility for reparations being 
limited to those charges and individuals convicted before the ICC and victim 
participation in the trial is unnecessary to claim reparations, it is perhaps worth 
thinking about creating a separate reparations chamber within the ICC unconnected 
from criminal convictions. Some may question whether the ICC is best situated to 
deal with reparations beyond those who are convicted before it. Yet given that the 
Court is often the only international or external adjudicating body dealing with these 
situation and is the only permanent forum for international crimes for 124 State 
Parties it is well placed to be an avenue for redress for victims where states are 
unwilling or unable to provide reparations. Although regional human rights courts to 
an extent do this already in Latin America, Europe and Africa, their jurisdiction is for 
wider human rights violations and the responsibility of the state. Increasingly 
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international crimes are transnational, committed by a range of non-state armed 
groups, mercenaries, multi-national corporations and states with limited or no forums 
for redress for victims.61 A reparations chamber at the ICC would focus on more 
acute international crimes where State Parties are unwilling or unable to investigate, 
prosecute or provide a remedy to victims.  
Others have advocated for such a separate Reparations Chamber or 
Commission, given the challenges currently facing the ICC reparations regime. 62  
This author has been reluctant to advocate for a separate chamber, given that those 
who have done so before have prompted it to remove victims from participating in 
trial proceedings at the Court. Victims participating at the ICC play an important part 
in ensuring the transparency of trial proceedings and to effectively protect their 
interests. 63  A reparations chamber suggested here would not get rid of victim 
participation in trial proceedings, but instead would work to provide reparations to 
victims in situations by directly engaging with states. The Trust Fund could be used to 
provide more interim awards to those victims applying to the Court, such as 
rehabilitation, similar to the provisional measures of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights to prevent death or irreparable harm.64 Alternatively focusing the TFV 
assistance mandate to directly focus on those victims before the ICC through 
provisional measures could help to concentrate resources on those cases before the 
Court. 
In terms of procedural and evidential rules, victims’ legal representatives 
would lead the presentation of evidence, supported by the Office of Public Counsel 
for Victims and Victims Participation and Reparations Section. Victims would have 
to satisfy the lower evidential burden of proof on the balance of probabilities common 
to reparations proceedings. The lower evidential threshold would allow a broader 
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establishment of the harm that was suffered. Victim application forms to participate 
and claim reparations would be submitted early in proceedings enabling the chamber 
to begin to map out the crimes, harms and views of victims on what reparations would 
look like. In order to protect the rights of any later identified individuals or 
responsible organisations, they would be invited to participate and any finding of civil 
responsibility could not be relied upon for a criminal trial, given the lower evidential 
burden. That said factual findings on whether or not certain crimes happened in a 
location, the nature of conflict etc. in a reparations judgment, could guide trial 
chambers’ understanding of a conflict, but would be inadmissible in proving the 
defendant’s criminal responsibility. Alternatively if reparations proceedings have not 
commenced, then a criminal conviction would be used for a basis of reparation as 
currently is the case under Article 75(2). Individual convicted persons found guilty 
would then contribute to reparations through symbolic measures such as 
acknowledgments of responsibility or voluntary apologies, or more material means 
through court-ordered seizure of their assets.65 
The Presidency could under the Rome Statute create a reparations chamber as 
part of a trial chamber.66 After the Lubanga decision, Trial Chamber II has effectively 
become a reparations chamber given that it is dealing with the implementation of 
reparations in the Lubanga case and is deciding on the reparations in Katanga case. 
The Appeals Chamber judgment on reparations in the Lubanga case also sets down 
clear monitoring and implementation requirements for the trial chamber for the TFV 
to carry out such as identifying eligible victims. This practice is making Trial 
Chamber II increasingly specialised in the adjudication on reparations. Moreover the 
distinct nature of reparations, lower evidential threshold, increasing participatory 
rights for victims and differing legal principles makes sense that the expertise gained 
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by court staff and judges is retained in a specialised reparation chamber. This can be 
added to with powers already available to the court in appointing reparations experts 
‘to assist it in determining the scope, extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in 
respect of victims and to suggest various options concerning the appropriate types and 
modalities of reparations’.67 
A reparations chamber would allow victims to directly petition the Court for 
reparations from the opening of a situation, rather than victims have to wait years for 
a criminal conviction. This solution provides a dual-track approach to dealing justice 
to victims and ending impunity by both at the same time investigation and prosecuting 
those responsible as well as allowing victims to come forward and make their case for 
reparations. A reparations chamber would also contribute to facilitating and 
monitoring states in building capacity on reparations, as the ICC itself could not 
deliver reparations to all victims in a situation, it could highlight the issue and order 
such awards to be carried out by the state with support from the TFV and Assembly 
of State Parties. Such an approach would balance the ICC from being perpetrator and 
retributive focused to more comprehensively doing justice for victims. Of course this 
can be dismissed as naïve, expanding the scope of a reparations system, which is 
already overburdened with just one case. There would be challenges for low-income 
countries in affording large reparations programmes, but innovative solutions can be 
found, such as World Bank or other donor support reparations as in Nepal, and 
countries like Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast have begun to deliver reparations to such 
victims despite their low-income status. Given the ICC’s unique position as a 
permanent international court on international crimes, it is well placed to be an 
avenue of redress for the world’s most serious crimes and to be a focal point for 
reparations. States and the ICC have to work together in delivering justice beyond 
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criminal trials to avoid a hierarchy of victims by delivering reparations to all those 
who seriously suffer from international crimes. 
Conclusion 
Reparations in law are about acknowledging, remedying and alleviating victims’ 
suffering. The inclusion of reparations in the Rome Statute of the ICC offered the 
promise of tangible and symbolic redress for victims of international crimes. Yet 
nearly two decades on from the signing of the Rome Statute and five years since the 
first reparations judgment, reparations have yet to make it into the hands and hearts of 
victims. Continuing legal wrangles on reparations at the ICC are trying to make an 
unworkable system feasible, but victims are increasing losing out as time passes. 
The problems with reparations at the ICC stem from pasting it onto the end of 
a criminal trial, which undermines its victim-centred nature. How far can we go with 
the current reparations model at the ICC to the extent that the Court can maintain any 
sort of legitimacy of its meaningful and effectiveness for victims that it does not re-
victimise them by creating unrealistic expectations or reparations so convoluted that 
they make no difference? The alternatives are to drop reparations from the ICC or to 
uncouple reparation proceedings from the criminal trial and create a reparations 
chamber. This will not be easy and states will protest it due to the issues of state 
responsibility it will raise if reform of Article 75 is brought before the Assembly of 
State Parties.  
The disagreeing positions of judges in the Lubanga and Ruto and Sang cases 
show the contested space that reparations continue to evoke amongst the ICC 
judiciary that they themselves alone cannot develop a consistent position on 
reparations, even if it did include state responsibility. Although Judge Eboe-Osuji 
opined a vision of reparations beyond those convicted at the ICC, it will require the 
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Assembly of State Parties to not only amend Article 75(2) to include state or other 
actors responsibility, but also enforcement mechanisms in how States cooperate with 
the Court. As such together transformative reparations, reparative complementarity 
and a reparations chamber together may start to bring the gap between victims’ right 
to reparations and redress at the ICC. 
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